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Hypothetical Example: Disclosure
The subsidiary of a Delaware (United States) corporation is incor-
porated in and conducts significant operations in a foreign country,
Country X. The subsidiary is one of the largest corporations in Coun-
try X, employing many nationals of that country. Allegations are made
that certain officers of the foreign-based subsidiary may have falsely
booked sales of the subsidiary in order to conceal losses of the subsidi-
ary which would have materially affected the overall financial results of
the corporation. Before the allegations were made, accountants in
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Country X issued an opinion that the financial statements of the subsid-
iary had been prepared in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles.
Pursuant to United States securities laws, the corporation filed
consolidated financial statements with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission). The statements were covered by a
United States auditor's report that did not make reference to the report
issued by the accountants in Country X.
The SEC investigates the allegations to determine their validity.
The SEC staff takes the depositions of the corporation's United States-
based officers and United States-based accountants. As a result, it ob-
tains evidence which suggests that the earnings have been falsified by
unknown individuals employed by the subsidiary and residing abroad.
It is unclear whether the person or persons employed by the subsidiary
who falsified the books were acting on their own or at the instance of
United States-based officers. The SEC now needs access to documents
and testimony of the foreign-based officers, employees, and accountants
in order to conduct a thorough investigation and determine who, if any-
one, is liable.
The United States and Country X have both ratified the Hague
Convention for the Taking of Evidence (Hague Convention or Conven-
tion),1 but they have not negotiated any bilateral agreements that would
relate to the investigatory activities of the SEC. Country X has enacted
a "blocking statute" similar either to that of Great Britain or to that of
France.
1. INTRODUCTION
Based on the above hypothetical, this paper will discuss the
problems that arise when the SEC, during the course of an investiga-
tion, requires access to persons and documents that are not in the
United States. In the hypothetical, the SEC clearly has domestic subject
matter (prescriptive) jurisdiction over the United States securities laws
with respect to the filing of false financial statements by a United States
corporation. This subject matter jurisdiction in all likelihood extends to
the actions of the foreign subsidiary abroad, primarily on the basis of
the "effects" doctrine of prescriptive jurisdiction under principles of in-
ternational law.2 We will assume, although the question is a close one,
1 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter
Convention].
2 The jurisdictional analyses under current international law most relevant to the
hypothetical are the "effects" doctrine and the "conduct" doctrine. Under the "effects"
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that because the report of the foreign auditors covering allegedly false
financial statements had effects in the United States, the foreign audi-
tors may also fall within the SEC's subject matter jurisdiction. The
issues to be discussed, therefore, concern not the SEC's general subject
matter or prescriptive jurisdiction over the wrongful acts alleged to have
been committed, but the difficulties that the agency may experience
when it attempts to carry out investigative and enforcement activities
with respect to persons and documents located abroad. Such difficulties
sometimes involve limits to the SEC's statutory enforcement power and
sometimes implicate constraints of due process - the extent to which
the SEC may, consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice," 3 enforce the securities laws beyond the territorial bor-
ders of the United States. Also involved are conflicts that arise with the
laws of other countries having concurrent prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction over the individuals and entities involved.
Section 2 of this article describes briefly the disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws with respect to financial statements.
Section 3 discusses the remedies available to the SEC if the financial
statements are false. This section includes a discussion of the emphasis
the United States places on prosecuting non-fraudulent conduct. Section
4 addresses some of the problems attendant on obtaining evidence and
testimony abroad, and Section 5 discusses some possible solutions, with
particular emphasis on various types of consent and bilateral or multi-
lateral assistance agreements.
It may help the reader to keep in mind that there are two distinct
phases to an enforcement action. The first is the investigation, which is
done confidentially without any disclosure and during which evidence is
gathered. The second is the proceeding itself, which may be an admin-
istrative proceeding before an administrative law judge or an action
filed in federal district court requesting the judge to issue an injunction
doctrine, it is permissible to apply United States law if conduct beyond its territorial
limits has a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the United States. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
18 (1965). Under the "conduct" doctrine, United States law can be applied if acts
occurred in this country. See id. § 17(a). A third theory permits application of United
States law with respect to United States nationals wherever located. See id. § 30. Under
the approach currently employed by United States courts to determine the applicability
of United States securities law, the court first considers whether application of our laws
is permissible under the "conduct" or "effects" principles of international law. If not,
our laws will not be applied, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to the
contrary. If international law would permit application of United States law, the court
then determines whether Congress intended our laws to apply to the particular situa-
tion being considered.
3 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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and grant other equitable relief. These proceedings are generally open
to the public and therefore may be widely reported.4 As a policy mat-
ter, we assume that mechanisms of international cooperation should not
compel the SEC to commence public proceedings prematurely in order
to obtain assistance - that is, the availability of foreign assistance
should not automatically depend on whether the SEC is in its investiga-
tory stage or whether formal proceedings have begun.
Problems of cooperation between the SEC and foreign authorities
are particularly complex in the disclosure area. Because the United
States considers accurate reporting to be essential to the operation of
the market, the SEC may impose sanctions upon improper disclosure
even if the error was unintentional. To the extent the violation was not
willful, the sanctions are restrained - restatement of financial state-
ments or correction of error, with no finding of fraud. Foreign nations
do not necessarily have a comparable policy. Thus, in the short run,
they are most likely to cooperate where the United States offense is
fraud, such as insider trading. In the long run, improper disclosure
may be viewed more harshly abroad as markets outside the United
States expand.
2. REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS REGARDING Fi-
NANCIAL STATEMENTS
In general, regulations promulgated by the SEC require that re-
ports and registration statements filed by issuers contain consolidated
financial statements. These statements must include the issuer and all
majority-owned subsidiaries.' The SEC places great emphasis on accu-
rate financial disclosure because it assumes that an efficient market
prices securities in response to such information - false or accurate -
whether or not an individual investor actually relied on such disclosure.
Thus, the filing of materially false financial statements constitutes
4 On the other hand, Rule 2(e)(7), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1986), currently pro-
vides that all Rule 2(e) proceedings shall be nonpublic, unless the SEC on its own
motion or on the request of a party otherwise directs. As discussed infra in Section 3.5,
Rule 2(e) is used by the SEC to discipline attorneys, accountants, and other
professionals.
5 A "majority-owned subsidiary" is defined as a "subsidiary more than 50% of
whose outstanding voting shares is owned by a parent and/or the parent's other major-
ity-owned subsidiaries." 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(m) (1986). A foreign issuer may, unless
any applicable rule provides otherwise, prepare financial statements according to the
generally accepted accounting principles [hereinafter GAAP] of its jurisdiction, so long
as certain notes reconciling foreign GAAP with United States GAAP are provided.
However, regardless of what accounting principles are applied, the SEC will not accept
financial statements unless they are prepared according to United States generally ac-
cepted accounting standards.
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fraud on the market.6
The professional standards of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) generally provide that an accountant who
examines the consolidated financial statements of an issuer when the
statements of a subsidiary of that issuer have been examined by another
accountant must determine whether or not to accept responsibility for
such other auditor's examination. If the principal auditor accepts such
responsibility, he need not refer to the other examination in his report.
If the auditor does not accept responsibility, he must refer specifically
to the other auditor's report. AICPA standards provide that an auditor
may name another auditor to whose work he refers but only with the
express consent of that auditor, and only if the other auditor's report is
presented. In this connection, the AICPA standards also reference SEC
Rule 2-05 of Regulation S-X,1 which requires that when reference is
made to the work of another auditor, the other auditor's report must in
most circumstances also be filed with that of the principal auditor. Fil-
ing the other auditor's report effectively reveals his identity. Therefore,
although the AICPA standards do not state as much directly, it appears
that, under the AICPA standards, the principal auditor, in complying
with SEC Rule 2-05, must have obtained the consent of the other
auditor.
The hypothetical example assumes that the United States auditors
made no reference to the report of the foreign auditors. Under AICPA
standards, this absence of reference does not relieve the foreign auditors
of responsibility, but it may make the SEC's enforcement efforts more
difficult.8
6 The "fraud-on-the-market" theory arose in the 1970s as an alternative to the
difficult task of proving actual reliance by investors. See Lipton v. Documation, Inc.,
734 F.2d 740, 742-48 (11 th Cir. 1984) (giving brief history of the theory and citing key
decisions), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-
08 (9th Cir. 1975); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143
(1982).
7 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-05 (1986).
8 If the foreign auditors had been named, which would have required their ex-
press consent, the SEC might have been able to take the position that such consent
constituted "practicing before the Commission" for purposes of Rule 2(e) proceedings
described infra in Section 3.5. It is unclear whether such consent would also confer on
the SEC and United States courts personal jurisdiction over the accountant. Arguably,
consent to use of its report falls short of consent to service of process. Since in the
hypothetical the foreign auditors were not named, SEC recourse with respect to their
actions may be limited.
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3. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
3.1. SEC Investigations
The SEC relies on the staff of its Division of Enforcement and
Regional Offices to develop facts and make appropriate recommenda-
tions as to whether an enforcement action should be brought. The
SEC's staff often investigates possible securities law violations infor-
mally. In an informal investigation, the staff lacks subpoena power9
and must therefore seek voluntary compliance with its requests for in-
formation or documents. If a person or entity refuses to testify volunta-
rily or to provide requested documents, the staff may recommend to the
Commission that it enter a formal order of private investigation.10 The
SEC has broad statutory authority to conduct such investigations to de-
termine whether any person or entity has violated, is currently violat-
ing, or is about to violate, any provision of the federal securities laws or
rules thereunder. In particular, the SEC may investigate any matter
where it appears to the Commission that: (1) the provisions of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)11 or the rules or regulations
promulgated thereunder "have been or are about to be violated";12 (2)
any person "has violated, is violating, or is about to violate" the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 3 or its rules or regulations,
or the rules of a national securities exchange, a registered securities
association, a registered clearing agency or the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board; 4 (3) any person "has violated or is about to vio-
late" the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company
Act) 5 or any rule, order or regulation thereunder;' 6 or (4) the provi-
sions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Advisers
Act) 17 or the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder "have been
or are about to be violated."' 8
The introductory language to these sections is quite broad;
"[w]henever it shall appear"1 9 is the phrase used in the Securities Act,
17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1986).
10 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.5(a), 203.4-.8 (1986).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982).
'e 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(a) (1982).
'7 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1982).
"8 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1982).
19 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1982).
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and "in [the Commission's] discretion"2 is the Exchange Act language.
Thus, these sections confer on the SEC a great deal of discretion as to
which cases to investigate. Moreover, United States courts will not re-
view what evidence the SEC had before it when it commenced its inves-
tigation.2 As a result, there is no standard such as "reasonable grounds
to believe" a violation has occurred. Because of this wide latitude to
investigate and because of the broad reach of SEC subpoena power,
foreign nationals and governments may be concerned that the staff is
conducting a "fishing expedition." Therefore, in the absence of definite,
mutually agreed upon criteria, foreign governments may be reluctant to
provide the SEC with assistance at the formal order stage. It should be
noted that, notwithstanding the broad latitude granted by the statutory
language, the SEC has long emphasized the discretion its staff, and the
Commission itself, exercise in commencing investigations.
The ease with which a formal order can be obtained especially
concerns foreigners in cases where the matter under investigation would
not be a crime in the foreign country where evidence/documents are
being sought. This concern over SEC formal orders may be further
heightened because the contents of the formal order itself typically re-
veal little of the facts underlying the SEC's suspicions.22 This is in
marked contrast to the considerable amount of detail found in a typical
SEC court complaint.23 Overall, as discussed in Section 5 below, it is
unlikely that the SEC can obtain effective assistance at the formal order
stage unless standards governing such requests are mutually agreed
upon by the SEC and foreign securities regulators.
The issuance of a formal order authorizes the SEC's staff to sub-
poena witnesses, take their testimony under oath, and require the pro-
duction of any relevant documents. Investigative subpoenas may be ju-
dicially enforced with noncompliance resulting in fine or imprisonment,
or both. The existence of an investigation and all information obtained
during it are generally kept strictly confidential unless and until a pub-
20 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
2 See, e.g., SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1975) (SEC has power of
"original inquiry" and need not "limit its investigations to those against whom 'proba-
ble' or even 'reasonable' cause to suspect a violation has been established"); SEC v.
Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1054 (2d Cir. 1973) (where investiga-
tion has legitimate purpose, SEC need not show "reasonable grounds" before issuing
investigative subpoenas), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
22 A sample SEC subpoena and a sample letter from the SEC seeking voluntary
cooperation in an informal SEC investigation are attached as Appendix A, p. 539, and
Appendix B, p. 541, respectively.
2 Complaints filed by private parties who, of course, cannot conduct investiga-
tions before filing, typically contain less detail than complaints filed by government
agencies.
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lic enforcement action is brought. There are statutory24 and SEC 25 rule
restrictions on the disclosure of nonpublic information obtained by the
SEC.2" Overall, the SEC has done an excellent job of maintaining the
confidentiality of information provided to it during an investigation.
Once the staff has gathered sufficient evidence, it determines
whether to recommend to the Commission that an enforcement action
be brought. Should the Commission decide, based on the staff's recom-
mendation and any submissions by parties, that an action should be
brought, it may authorize the staff to commence a civil injunctive ac-
tion, institute an administrative proceeding, or refer evidence of crimi-
nal violations to the United States Department of Justice, the entity
authorized to institute criminal proceedings.
3.2. Commission Injunctive Actions
The SEC has specific statutory authority to bring a civil suit in
federal district court to enjoin a company or other person from viola-
tions of the federal securities laws.25 To obtain a permanent injunction,
the statutes require the SEC to demonstrate that the defendant is en-
gaged or is about to engage in a securities law violation. The SEC must
therefore convince the court that there exists a reasonable likelihood
that the defendant(s) will engage in future violations of the securities
laws. In an injunctive action, the SEC may seek equitable relief in ad-
dition to an order not to violate the law again.29
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 77uuu(b), 78x(b), 79v(c), 80a-44, 80b-10 (1982).
25 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.25, 202.5(a), 203.2, 230.122, 230.406, 240.0-4,
250.104 (1986).
26 As discussed in Section 5 infra, foreigners may be concerned by the possibility
that information about them in the SEC's possession will be requested by a third party
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) [hereinafter FOIA].
While this is a legitimate concern once an enforcement proceeding is concluded, Ex-
emption 7(A) under the FOIA does protect from disclosure to private parties "investi-
gatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings ....
Id. § 552(b)(7) (1982).
27 Violation of an injunction can also result in the imposition of civil or criminal
contempt.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77uuu, 78u(d), 79r(f, 80a-41(e), 80b-9(e) (1982 & Supp.
1985).
29 In addition to this possibility of equitable relief, including, for example, dis-
gorgement, the entry of an injunction has significant collateral consequences. For exam-
ple, an injunction obtained against a public company or one of its officers or directors
must be disclosed by the company. Also, certain exemptions under the Securities Act
become unavailable once an injunction is entered. The most immediate impact of an
injunction, however, may frequently be the reputational harm to the subject of the
injunction. An injunction against committing fraud is premised on a finding that fraud
was committed and that there is a reasonable likelihood of future fraudulent acts.
Clearly, individuals do not like to be thus characterized as persons likely to commit
1987]
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3.3. Administrative Proceedings
Several provisions of the federal securities laws authorize the
Commission to sanction a person or entity after an administrative hear-
ing.30 While the greatest number of administrative proceedings are
brought against broker-dealers or persons associated with such entities,
of particular relevance to the disclosure area is the Commission's au-
thority under section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act3 to bring adminis-
trative proceedings against issuers of securities who fail to comply with
the disclosure and certain other provisions of the Exchange Act. Also, a
1984 amendment to the Exchange Act 2 authorizes the SEC to proceed
administratively against officers or directors or other individuals who
cause a failure to comply with the disclosure and several other provi-
sions of the Exchange Act. This would apply to individuals who,
through booking of nonexistent sales or otherwise, cause an issuer to
file false financial statements.
There are several important differences between a SEC adminis-
trative proceeding and a SEC injunctive action. An injunctive action is
brought before a federal district court judge who can, as noted above,
impose a permanent injunction once a violation of the law and a rea-
sonable likelihood of future violations is demonstrated.33 An adminis-
trative proceeding is brought by the SEC's Division of Enforcement
before an administrative law judge (ALJ) who is an employee of the
SEC. A finding of fraud can only be made by a federal district court
judge, not by an ALJ. An ALJ can only determine that there has been
a failure to comply with the securities law provision in question, not
whether such failure was fraudulent. For example, if the disclosure vio-
lations in our hypothetical are determined to be negligent or inadver-
tent, the SEC would be able to proceed before either a federal court or
an ALJ, but the existence of fraud is a finding that could only be made
by a court. In an administrative proceeding, the initial appeal is from
the ALJ to the Commission itself, not to a court.34 After the Commis-
fraudulent acts. As one court noted, "[tihe sting of the decree lies in the implication that
the defendants are dishonest." Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC, 130 F.2d 214, 220 (9th Cir.
1942). The SEC frequently enters into "consent injunctions" with defendants pursuant
to which, without a trial of the case, the defendant(s) agrees to the entry of an injunc-
tion (and any agreed-upon ancillary relief) without admitting or denying the findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
30 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b), 78o-4(c), 79m(d), 80a-8(e), 80a-9(b), 80b-3(e)
(1982).
31 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
32 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 4, 98 Stat. 1264,
1265 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (Supp. 1985)).
3 No such requirement is imposed on the SEC in an administrative proceeding.
, 17 C.F.R. § 201.17 (1986).
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sion has rendered a decision, it can be appealed to a federal court of
appeals.35
Sanctions imposed in an administrative proceeding vary according
to the provisions violated, the seriousness of the violations, and the spe-
cific authority for the proceeding. For example, companies found to
have made false filings with the SEC may be ordered to correct false
reports by restating their financials and correcting any other aspects of
the filing(s) that are false. 6 Although an ALJ can order the correction
of past filings, an ALJ cannot enjoin future conduct.
The authority to correct false filings through the use of an admin-
istrative proceeding is especially significant because of the importance
the United States places on maintaining efficient national securities
markets. Because of its emphasis on efficient markets, the SEC is deter-
mined to ensure the accuracy of information provided to investors in
these markets. Thus, even if the improper disclosure were negligent or
inadvertent, a sanction may still be appropriate. Such a sanction is im-
posed through an administrative proceeding in which the SEC makes
findings as to the inaccuracy and orders correction. Because of the ab-
sence of intent, however, there would be no injunction, no fine, no pen-
alty, just the correction of error. Indeed, there is considerable authority
that the SEC may not, in such a proceeding, find a violation of any of
the antifraud sections of the statute or the rules promulgated thereun-
der.37 Because such proceedings lack counterparts elsewhere, it is diffi-
cult to persuade other nations to render assistance unless the SEC al-
leges that the failure may have been willful and therefore fraudulent.
As discussed in Section 5 below, as the securities markets of other na-
tions expand and compete with the United States markets, foreign na-
tions may as a policy matter develop comparable procedures to insure
market efficiency which depends upon accurate information. This in
turn could lead to more willingness to lend assistance in non-fraudulent
matters.
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i, 7 8y, 79x, 80a-42, 80b-13 (1982).
" In some administrative proceedings involving reporting violations in which the
defendant(s) consented to negotiated settlements, the SEC has issued orders that go
beyond compelling correction of such reports. For example, in section 15(c)(4) adminis-
trative proceedings, the SEC has ordered the issuer to retain independent consultants,
or to adopt appropriate accounting practices and procedures. See McLucas & Roma-
nowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section 15(cX4) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 145, 151, 167-73 (1985).
'7 In this regard, a SEC formal order will typically allege potential reporting and
fraud violations in a disclosure investigation. Once the investigation is completed, a
decision will be made whether to bring a civil action or to bring an administrative
proceeding. Since at the outset fraud is included, foreign assistance may be rendered,
absent objections to "fishing expeditions." However, additional foreign assistance may
not be available for any subsequent proceeding not alleging fraud.
1987)
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
3.4. Criminal Referral Process
Although the SEC conducts its own civil litigation and administra-
tive proceedings, it lacks the authority to bring criminal actions. Crimi-
nal actions are brought only by the United States Department of Jus-
tice, headed by the Attorney General. The SEC is authorized to refer
evidence of criminal violations to the Attorney General, who may insti-
tute criminal proceedings. Criminal sanctions for federal securities law
violations include fines and up to five-years imprisonment per viola-
tion. 8 Both the SEC's decision whether or not to refer a case to the
Attorney General, and the Attorney General's decision whether or not
to prosecute, are discretionary in nature.
The SEC typically assists the Department of Justice and the ap-
propriate United States Attorney by discussing cases with them and
providing them with access to information and documents in the SEC's
nonpublic investigative files. In some instances, the SEC also provides
the Justice Department with SEC personnel familiar with a case to
assist in its presentation to a grand jury or at trial. SEC recommenda-
tion of criminal prosecution is generally reserved for more serious viola-
tions, such as fraud.
3.5. Rule 2(e) Proceedings
Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice39 is the vehicle utilized
by the SEC to discipline attorneys, accountants and other professionals
with respect to activities undertaken in their professional capacities
(e.g., auditing financial statements of a public company) or for viola-
tions of the securities laws involving improper professional conduct. In
particular, Rule 2(e) authorizes the SEC to deny, temporarily or per-
manently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it to any per-
son, including an attorney or accountant, who is found by the
Commission:
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent
others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to
have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct,
or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abet-
ted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities
laws (15 U.S.C. § 77a to 80b-20), or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder.40
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff, 80a-48, 80b-17 (1982).
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1986).
40 Id.
[Vol. 9:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss3/4
PAPER PRESENTED: E. GREENE
In recent years, the SEC has imposed a variety of sanctions on
accountants and attorneys under Rule 2(e). Orders of the Commission
imposing a sanction under Rule 2(e) are judicially reviewable by the
appropriate United States court of appeals.
3.6. Section 21(a) Reports
The SEC is authorized by section 21(a) of the Exchange Act"1 to
publish information regarding alleged violations of that Act. Such pub-
lication informs interested parties about the SEC's interpretations of
the securities laws, and may provide the public with examples of con-
duct which, in the SEC's view at least, fail to meet minimum required
standards. A section 21(a) report may be accompanied by the institu-
tion of enforcement proceedings.
3.7. Other Remedies
3.7.1. Foreign Restricted List
The SEC has the authority to place a company on the foreign
restricted list.42 This is a list of foreign companies whose securities the
Commission believes are being traded in violation of the registration
provisions of the Securities Act.
3.7.2. Stop-orders
If the Commission determines after a hearing that a registration
statement contains material misrepresentations or omissions, it can is-
sue a "stop-order" pursuant to Securities Act section 8(d).43 This
would prevent or suspend the effectiveness of the issuer's Securities Act
registration statement.
3.7.3. Exchange Act Section 12(k)
Under this section of the Exchange Act," the SEC can, without
any administrative proceeding, order the suspension of trading in a par-
ticular security for ten days. The section is typically used where ade-
quate and accurate financial information about a company is not pub-
licly available.
41 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
42 Id.; see also Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647, 650-51 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (discussing effect of such a list and affirming statutory authority of SEC to pub-
lish it).
43 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1982).
44 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1982).
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3.7.4. 12U) Orders
The Commission has authority pursuant to Exchange Act section
12(j)" 5 to suspend or prohibit further trading in a security if it finds
that the issuer has failed to comply with any provision of the Exchange
Act. For example, if an issuer violates the disclosure obligations of the
Exchange Act by filing false financial statements, the SEC can suspend
or prohibit public trading in the issuer's securities. Unlike the SEC's
summary powers under section 12(k), a hearing is required before the
Commission can exercise its section 12() authority.
4. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN ACHIEVING THE COMMISSION'S GOALS
The discussion that follows will consider three different stages of
Commission action, two of which have similar consequences in terms of
gathering evidence. If we assume that the SEC is conducting an investi-
gation under a formal order of investigation or, having completed its
investigation, has commenced an administrative proceeding before an
ALJ, the Commission will encounter significant barriers, described be-
low, to obtaining the assistance ii requires in gathering evidence
abroad. If, on the other hand, the SEC, on completing its investigation,
has filed a civil injunctive action, it will have greater resources for gath-
ering evidence through both United States and international channels,
but will, as also described below, nonetheless encounter problems that
may best be solved by some of the mechanisms suggested in Section 5.
In connection with its investigation, administrative proceeding, or
pretrial discovery for a civil injunctive proceeding, the SEC will wish to
examine the books and records of the foreign subsidiary and the work
papers of the foreign accountant. The SEC may also wish to depose the
foreign accountant and the officers and employees of the foreign subsid-
iary. This discussion assumes that the United States corporation does
not maintain the records and books of its foreign subsidiary in the
United States. Similarly, we shall assume that the United States ac-
countant does not possess the work papers of the foreign accountant.
Typically, neither the United States corporation nor its subsidiary, nor
the foreign accountant will be willing to cooperate and the SEC will be
forced to compel production of documents and testimony.
4.1. Formal Order of Investigation
As described in Section 3.1, SEC proceedings under a formal order
of investigation are nonpublic. The SEC may, under a formal order,
45 15 U.S.C. § 781(j) (1982).
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directly subpoena documents and testimony. The service of an investi-
gatory subpoena effectively compels the person on whom it is served to
produce documents or appear to testify. If such documents and testi-
mony are not forthcoming, the SEC may apply to a United States dis-
trict court for enforcement of its subpoena. The court may issue an
order requiring the person to comply with the subpoena, and failure to
do so may be punished as contempt of court."' In order to issue an
order compelling a person to respond to a SEC investigative subpoena
and to sanction such person for noncompliance, a United States court
must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over that per-
son. However, United States courts have held that the statutory grant
of jurisdiction 47 on which the SEC relies for its investigatory subpoena
power does not authorize the SEC to serve investigatory subpoenas on a
foreign citizen in a foreign nation nor does it authorize a court to en-
force such a subpoena."' On the other hand, a subpoena properly
served in the United States in connection with a matter the SEC may
properly investigate may be used to compel a person to produce docu-
ments located abroad.49 An investigatory subpoena would thus not be
available to the SEC for use against the foreign accountant, assuming
that the accountant has no presence in the United States. Under certain
circumstances, the SEC could properly serve its investigatory subpoena
on the foreign subsidiary and a United States court could find it had
subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary." If the
46 If a corporation has failed to comply, it or its officers or agents may be held in
contempt. Contempt of court is punishable by daily fines seeking to compel compliance
and such fines may be secured by the assets of a recalcitrant person or corporation
wherever they may be found and lawfully attached. If noncompliance continues, a per-
son may be arrested and imprisoned for a stated amount of time or until he complies.
See, e.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312
(D.C. Cir. 1980). CFTC v. Nahas, 580 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D.D.C. 1983), vacated,
783 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984), illustrates the power of a court to sanction for con-
tempt, although in this instance the sanctions were overturned by the court of appeals.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b), 77uuu(a), 78u(b), 79r(c), 80a-41(b), 80b-9(b) (1982).
48 See CFTC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d at 493. The court in Nahas construed a provi-
sion in the Commodity Exchange Act which at the time was nearly identical to section
21(b) & (c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b)-(c) (1982), and similar to section
19(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1982), in such a way as to ensure that
the provision would not violate international law. Cf SEC v. A.H. Zangeneh, 470 F.
Supp. 1307 (D.D.C. 1978). In Zanganeh the court held that the SEC could not sub-
poena the testimony of a foreign witness merely by serving the subpoena at the offices
of a corporation organized to hold certain lands for his children. The court suggested
that the result might be different if the person "had in some fashion submitted to the
SEC's jurisdiction." Id. at 1307.
'1 See, e.g., SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
50 See In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1215 (1983). In Marc Rich, which involved a grand jury subpoena, the court found
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a Swiss corporation, since the viola-
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foreign subsidiary did not comply with a court's order enforcing the
SEC subpoena, the court could impose the sanctions described above,
including holding officers and directors in contempt and freezing any
reachable corporate assets as security for fines to be levied on the sub-
sidiary or on its officers.
In effect, sanctions imposed by a United States court for failure to
comply with an investigatory subpoena are the only remedies available,
because foreign courts may not be willing to enforce subpoenas at the
request of the SEC. The sanctions impose pressure to comply. This
situation creates the conflict of laws described below if secrecy or block-
ing statutes apply, which they may at the investigatory stage. More-
over, foreign officials may be concerned because United States courts, in
determining whether they have jurisdiction, may take a broad view of
the reach of that jurisdiction without considering adequately the inter-
ests of the nation affected and without formally consulting the govern-
ment involved. Thus, sanctions with respect to offshore entities are
likely to produce a negative reaction among foreign sovereign states,
especially if the entity has a substantial presence in the foreign
jurisdiction.
If the SEC could not subpoena the subsidiary directly, it would
have to serve its investigative subpoena on the domestic parent to com-
pel it to produce the documents and personnel of the subsidiary. A
court could impose the sanctions described above upon the parent for
tion alleged was conspiracy by the corporation and its wholly-owned United States
subsidiary to evade United States tax laws, directors of the parent resided in the United
States and were amenable to service there, and some of the conspiracy took place there.
Id. at 668.
Service of the subpoena on the subsidiary could be effected if, as in Marc Rich, an
officer or director of the subsidiary could be found in the United States or an agent for
process had been appointed in the United States. Service might be effected if a United
States court found that the subsidiary was, in effect, the alter ego of its parent such that
the parent was its agent for service. Cf. Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc.,
575 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1983). In Hoffman, a product liability case, the court
determined that service on a parent reached a subsidiary for purposes of notice by
conducting an alter ego analysis, applying such factors as the percentage of stock own-
ership, the existence of common directors or officers, the adequacy of capitalization of
the subsidiary, and the degree of independent action of the subsidiary. Id. at 1478. The
necessary personal jurisdiction might be based on a finding that the subsidiary did
business in the United States or that its actions had effects on the United States or that,
as the subsidiary was the alter ego of its parent, the parent's business in the United
States could be imputed to the subsidiary. But see Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979). In Walker, also a product liability
case, the court held that even though a German subsidiary was wholly owned by its
United States parent, the parent's control over the subsidiary was not sufficient to im-
pute to the subsidiary the business the parent did in the United States for purposes of
establishing personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary. Id. at 167. See also the discussion
of personal jurisdiction infra note 60.
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noncompliance if it found that the parent exercised sufficient custody or
control over the documents sought that it could produce such docu-
ments, or sufficient control over the subsidiary that it could be expected
to be able to require the personnel of the subsidiary to comply with
such a subpoena. 5' It is likely that a court would find that a domestic
parent of a wholly owned foreign subsidiary for which it filed consoli-
dated financial statements with the SEC had sufficient control over the
books and other documents of such subsidiary to be required to deliver
such books and documents to the SEC in response to a subpoena served
on the parent.52 However, whether or not a court would be willing to
find that the parent had sufficient control over its foreign subsidiary to
be able to compel the appearance and testimony of personnel of such
subsidiary is a more difficult question. As a practical matter, especially
with respect to the compelled testimony of the subsidiary's personnel, a
court would probably conduct an alter ego analysis in deciding whether
the corporate identities were sufficiently separate to enable the parent
to argue successfully that it could not compel its subsidiary to produce
the desired testimony.
In summary, the SEC would almost certainly be unable to sub-
poena the work papers or the testimony of the foreign accountant. Its
ability to reach the books and records and personnel of the subsidiary
would depend either on the SEC's ability to reach the subsidiary di-
rectly and/or on certain determinations regarding its relationship with
its parent.
At the investigatory stage, the SEC will be unable to use the
Hague Convention53 because that agreement applies only to judicial
proceedings commenced or contemplated. Therefore, given the problem-
atical nature of its investigatory subpoena power with respect to per-
sons and entities located abroad, and the limited utility of and the pub-
lic outcry caused by imposition of sanctions, the SEC, when operating
under a formal order of investigation, will largely be dependent upon
the kind of bilateral agreement exemplified in the Memorandum of
51 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 920
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (a domestic corporation having documents within its control cannot be
allowed to shield such documents from discovery by storing them with a foreign affili-
ate). But see In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 733 (5th Cir.
1985) (refusing to find that a domestic subsidiary has custody or control of a foreign
parent's records), cert. vacated, 106 S. Ct. 2887 (1986).
52 Alternatively, a domestic parent with a substantial presence in the United
States might be willing to put considerable pressure on its subsidiary to cooperate with
the SEC (ignoring, for the moment, the existence of a blocking statute that might pro-
hibit such cooperation).
" Convention, supra note 1. For a discussion of the application of the Convention
to assistance in the securities field, see infra notes 63-108 and accompanying text.
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Understanding with Switzerland (Swiss MOU),54 which provides for
cooperation between the SEC and Swiss authorities, although the reach
of some of these agreements is uncertain. 5 Such bilateral agreements
might also prevent the employment of secrecy laws and blocking stat-
utes which may come into play at the investigatory stage of SEC en-
forcement efforts.56
4.2. Administrative Proceeding
If the SEC, subsequent to its investigation, brings an administra-
tive action against the corporation and its subsidiary (assuming the
SEC has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary),
the production of documents and testimony of witnesses will be con-
ducted pursuant to the Commission's Rules of Practice .5 As a practical
matter, the SEC will be unable to compel the production of evidence
from the foreign accountants and will be able to compel the production
of documents and testimony from the subsidiary only insofar as it
would have been able to do so at the investigatory stage. In addition,
the Hague Convention for the Taking of Evidence will be unavailable,
because it applies only to judicial proceedings. 8 Therefore, again, in-
ternational agreements providing for assistance in such matters will be
the most useful methods of obtaining evidence with respect to an ad-
ministrative proceeding, provided such agreements are available in the
case of administrative as well as civil proceedings.
4.3. Civil Injunctive Proceeding
Putting aside the question of the applicability of the Hague Con-
vention for the Taking of Evidence, discussed below, if the SEC files a
civil injunctive action in federal court, discovery is carried out under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Although discovery under
the FRCP is largely conducted by the parties without recourse to the
court, the FRCP do provide for means to compel parties and, to a lim-
ited extent, third-party witnesses in a civil action to participate in dis-
covery.59 Indeed, the difficulties attendant on obtaining evidence under
" Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement in the Field of Insider Trading, done Aug.
31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Swiss MOU].
11 See infra Section 5, which discusses the advantages of bilateral and multilateral
agreements as contrasted with case-by-case enforcement of investigatory subpoenas.
58 See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.29 (1986).
88 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 15, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, 2564.
5 Sanctions available against persons refusing to participate in discovery are set
out in FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
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a formal order of investigation may encourage the SEC to file a civil
injunctive action earlier or on less compelling evidence than it might
otherwise have done. This is not necessarily a satisfactory result for
either the SEC or those it investigates, because an investigation is non-
public (and the SEC is considered to have an excellent record of keep-
ing such investigations confidential), while an injunctive proceeding is
not.
In order to adjudicate a controversy, a United States court must
have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a party to the
action.60 We will assume that the SEC has named as parties, and a
court has found jurisdiction over, the corporation and its foreign subsid-
iary, together with individual officers or employees who are alleged to
have committed the acts complained of. Therefore, under the FRCP, a
court could compel production of documents, responses to interrogato-
ries and appearance for depositions and could sanction, using Rule 37
of the FRCP, parties who did not comply. Sanctions under Rule 37
may include contempt as well as adverse findings against a party who
does not cooperate in discovery. Adverse findings against the subsidiary
may be an effective means of compulsion. A finding of contempt against
officers and directors of the subsidiary or against individual defendants
may be effective if assets of the subsidiary or the individuals are availa-
ble to be frozen. The threat of imprisonment may also be effective if an
individual officer or director may be reached. However, as a practical
matter, the threat of imprisonment will be ineffective against individu-
als who are located outside the United States and are willing to remain
60 We have assumed that the SEC and therefore the court will have subject matter
jurisdiction over the filing of false financial statements by a United States corporation
and that such subject matter jurisdiction will extend to the subsidiary under the "ef-
fects" doctrine. Personal jurisdiction is generally based on a finding that a party has
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (in this case, with the United States) such
that maintenance of a suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice." See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Personal jurisdiction may be
based on the fact that the party does business in the United States, or has committed
the act complained of there, or that its acts have "effects" in the United States (similar
to the "effects" on which subject matter jurisdiction is based). See Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 998-1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
In addition, a court must be able to effect service of notice on a party. Service of notice
on foreign parties is provided for by FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
The Supreme Court's recent refusal in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 1026 (1987), to extend jurisdiction to a foreign manufacturer whose goods entered
the United States may signal a narrowing of the scope of effects jurisdiction. For a
discussion of the Court's opinion in this case, see Comment, The Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of State Long-Arm Statutes and the Impact on the International Commercial
Community: A Comment and Suggested Approach (to be published in volume 9, issue
4, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law, fall 1987).
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abroad permanently.
On the other hand, we will assume that the SEC has not named
the foreign accountant as a party."1 In this event, a court's power under
the FRCP to compel either production of documents or the testimony
abroad of mere third-party witnesses, who would not be amenable to
local service and who are not United States citizens or residents, is lim-
ited to the issuance, at the discretion of the court, of letters rogatory to
a foreign court.6 2 Letters rogatory, which are issued through the United
States Department of State, are generally executed under local rules of
procedure, which may have limitations on compulsion.
Instead of proceeding to carry out and compel discovery under the
procedures authorized by the FRCP, which contemplate discovery car-
ried on largely by the parties without judicial interference, except in
instances where compulsion is necessary, the SEC may be required to
obtain the evidence it needs, from both parties and nonparties, pursuant
to the specific procedures authorized by the Hague Convention. 3 The
Hague Convention represents in part an effort to reconcile the differ-
ences between discovery procedures in civil law countries, where discov-
ery is largely controlled by the court, and those in common law coun-
tries, where as described above, discovery is controlled by parties.64 As
noted above, the Hague Convention may not be used to obtain evidence
which is not intended for use in judicial proceedings commenced or
contemplated. 5 The Convention is, therefore, not available either at the
investigatory stage or for use in SEC administrative proceedings. In-
deed, it has been alleged that SEC civil injunctive proceedings, al-
though denominated as civil proceedings, are not civil proceedings as
contemplated by the Hague Convention.6
The Convention establishes three basic methods for obtaining evi-
61 We have assumed that the foreign accountants have no presence in the United
States. It is unclear whether a court would find that the accountants' acts have suffi-
cient effects in the United States to warrant personal jurisdiction.
62 Letters rogatory are specifically authorized in FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3).
63 Convention, supra note 1. Twenty-five nations participated in negotiating and
drafting this Treaty. To date, the Convention has entered into force in eighteen nations.
8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15 (1987).
" See, e.g., Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Dis-
covery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1464 (1984).
65 See supra notes 53, 58 and accompanying text.
66 The SEC has successfully overcome such an allegation in several instances. For
example, in connection with letters of request issued by the court in SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the Praetor's Court of Milan
rejected such an argument. For a discussion of this case, see Mann & Sullivan, Current
Issues in International Securities Law Enforcement: An Update in 2 COURSE HAND-
BOOK FOR PLI SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 1986, at 510-11 (1986).
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dence in foreign nations: letters of request, 67 use of diplomatic or consu-
lar officials,68 and use of designated private commissioners.69 Letters of
request are the only method of obtaining evidence under the Conven-
tion that, as a practical matter, provides for compulsion by foreign au-
thorities.70 This paper assumes for purposes of discussion that the per-
sons involved in the hypothetical will not voluntarily provide documents
and testimony, and that the SEC will need to utilize a method of dis-
covery offering a means of compulsion. The discussion below will
therefore concentrate on letters of request. The SEC could use letters of
request, inter alia, to conduct examination of persons, address specific
questions to witnesses, and inspect documents of both the subsidiary
and the foreign accountants. The Convention provides that the receiv-
ing state's provisions for compelling discovery apply,7' and witnesses
may assert privileges under the laws of either the requesting state or
the receiving state. 2 A receiving state may refuse to execute a letter of
request if, inter alia, it considers its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced by complying with the request. 3 A receiving state may not
refuse to execute a letter either because it claims exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter or because its laws do not recognize the cause of
action involved. 4
One problem that the SEC has asserted as a factor complicating its
attempts to use the Convention is Article 23, which permits a signatory
to declare that "it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the
purposes of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries."7 5 Twelve signatories have made Article 23
" Letters of request are similar to letters rogatory authorized under Rule 28(b) of
the FRCP, except that they are transmitted to the receiving court by means of Hague
Convention procedures. Indeed, Rule 28(b) appears to contemplate the application of
the Hague Convention to the taking of depositions abroad. The Convention, supra note
1, treats letters of request in arts. 1-14, 23 U.S.T. at 2557-64.
" Convention, supra note 1, arts. 15-22, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-68.
" Id.
70 Unless states declare that a diplomatic officer, consular official or commissioner
may apply to the central authority for assistance in compelling testimony, the taking of
evidence by such officials or private commissioners is confined to those situations in
which the witness voluntarily testifies. Convention, supra note 1, art. 18, 23 U.S.T. at
2566. Five states have made a declaration permitting applications for assistance: Cy-
prus, Czechoslovakia, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. 8 MARTIN-
DALE-HUBBEI.i. LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15-21 (1987). West Germany prohibits the
taking of evidence of German nationals under this provision. Id. at 16.
71 Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. at 2561.
72 Id. art. 11, 23 U.S.T. at 2562.
73 Id. art. 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63.
74 Id.
75 Id. art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568. For a discussion of SEC difficulties with this
provision, see Mann & Sullivan, supra note 66, at 504.
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declarations, although they differ in their terms. West Germany, for
example, has adopted a declaration that repeats the terms of Article
23.7 France, which had originally taken the same course, recently
modified its Article 23 reservation to permit documentary discovery in
cases where "the requested documents are limitatively enumerated in
the letter of request and have a direct and clear nexus with the subject
matter of the litigation."" The United Kingdom's declaration is by its
terms designed to require specificity in letters of request. 8 At early
stages of litigation, it is questionable whether the SEC would be wholly
successful in identifying documents with sufficient particularity to sat-
isfy such anti-"fishing" limitations on discovery. Overall, in the SEC's
view, "there remain some questions concerning the Convention's effec-
tiveness as a general matter in producing needed discovery.
''
)
9
" Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal have made similar declarations. 8 MARTIN-
DALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 17-19 (1987).
" See Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as depository of the Convention
(Dec. 24, 1986).
8 The United Kingdom will not execute letters of request that require a person:
"a. to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of Request
relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody, or power; or b. to produce any
documents other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being
documents appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be in his possession,
custody, or power." 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7 at 19 (1987).
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden have
made similarly limited declarations. Id. at 15-19. The Evidence (Proceedings in Other
Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 by which the United Kingdom gave effect to the Hague
Convention repeats the terms of its Article 23 declaration. Under the 1975 Act, English
courts take "a strict attitude ... in giving effect to foreign requests for the production
of documents" and will not "countenance 'fishing' expeditions." Rio Tinto Zinc Corp.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547, 609.
"0 Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
amici curiae at 15, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court for the Dist. of Iowa (No. 85-1695), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986). In
that brief, the SEC stated that, on four recent occasions, it attempted to employ the
Convention's procedures to obtain evidence from nonparties for use in enforcement ac-
tions with the following reported results: In connection with SEC v. Banca Della Sviz-
zera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the SEC sought documents and testi-
mony from nonparty witnesses residing in Italy and Guernsey. Although the Italian
court ordered testimony, it declined to compel production of documents because of It-
aly's Article 23 declaration. Brief at 17 n.17. A court in Guernsey ordered two wit-
nesses to testify but the Deputy Bailiff of Guernsey ultimately found that the testimony
was "a search for defendants" in the nature of a fishing expedition. Id. The Italian
proceedings consumed two months and $20,000 in court costs and fees. Id. at 17. The
Guernsey proceedings consumed eight months and $50,000 in foreign counsel fees. Id.
at 17-18. In connection with SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common
Stock of, and Call Options for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 1985 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,951 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1985), the SEC sought documents
and testimony from nonparty witnesses residing in England and France. The English
request yielded useful evidence after nine months and $40,000 in foreign counsel fees.
Brief at 16 n.15. Although a French court granted the SEC's request, the witness re-
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Considering the difficulties that the SEC perceives to attend the
use of the Hague Convention, it will in all likelihood prefer to rely
directly on the FRCP to conduct discovery, without the involvement of
foreign authorities or courts. However, there has been some controversy
among state and federal courts in the United States as to when and
whether parties may forego Hague Convention procedures when con-
ducting discovery among foreign nationals in the United States and
abroad. While some courts have required litigants to use the Conven-
tion as a matter of international comity or judicial restraint,80 courts
requiring use of the Convention have generally taken the view that, if
resort to the Convention fails, the FRCP may be employed directly."1
In the Aerospatiale litigation, 2 the United States Supreme Court is
currently considering the proper roles of the Hague Convention and the
FRCP. In the opinion below, the Eighth Circuit followed the lead of
several other courts in holding that the Convention has no application
to pretrial discovery from parties subject to the in personam jurisdiction
of the court (regardless of those parties' nationality) where testimony is
to be taken or documents are to be produced in the United States, even
though such documents are found originally in a foreign country. 3
Similarly, with regard to interrogatories, these courts have taken the
position that Hague Convention procedures do not apply where the in-
terrogatories are served in the United States, even if the necessary in-
fused to testify. The French court imposed a "minor fine." Id. at 16 n.16. The United
States subsequently filed a letter with the Supreme Court correcting the statement ir
the brief with respect to the French request. That letter explained that the witness in
France challenged the request before the local courts. The French government defended
the validity of the request and ultimately prevailed. By then, however, the request for
evidence had become moot because the witness had subsequently been named as a de-
fendant and was engaged in settlement negotiations with the SEC. The proceedings had
taken eighteen months. Letter from the Solicitor General of the United States to the
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 19, 1986).
80 See, e.g., S & S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. 600, 615-18
(M.D. Tenn. 1986) (requiring use of Hague Convention as a matter of comity and
based on defendant's promise to cooperate); Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court,
137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (Ct. App. 1982) (requiring use of
Hague Convention as a matter of international comity and judicial restraint).
1 See, e.g., S & S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. at 618; Phila-
delphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60-61 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
82 In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted sub. nom. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
83 Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d at 124-25; see also In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm
GmbH, 757 F.2d at 731; In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 611 (5th Cir.
1985), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth., 54 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. July 17, 1985) (No. 85-98); Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 521 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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formation is located abroad. 4 According to these courts, the rationale
for their distinction between discovery deemed to be taking place in the
United States even if preparatory steps are taken abroad and discovery
entirely taken abroad is that a foreign government's sovereignty is not
implicated by the former.8" At least one other court and several govern-
ments, including the United States, have specifically rejected the ration-
ale of this line of cases.8"
The United States Supreme Court has recently heard oral argu-
ments in Aerospatiale.1 Until the Court announces its decision, the
question of under what circumstances the SEC must utilize Hague
Convention procedures with respect to foreign parties will remain
unclear.
8 In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d at 611.
85 Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d at 124-25. Courts taking this position have not specifi-
cally addressed the question of whether testimony given on foreign soil would necessa-
rily require the use of the Hague Convention, even if the court in question had the
power to require such testimony to take place in the United States. Dictum in In re
Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, is suggestive. After ordering a
party to produce an expert witness for deposition in the United States and holding that
under these circumstances the Hague Convention did not apply, the court noted that
the situation might be different if the deposition were to be given on foreign soil. Id. at
733. See also In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d at 611 n.25 (violation of an-
other country's judicial sovereignty can be avoided by ordering that a deposition take
place outside the foreign country). But see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am.World Air-
ways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984). In this case, which involved the taking of deposi-
tions of two directors of Lufthansa, the court held that "the Hague Convention does not
constitute the exclusive means by which the plaintiff may secure discovery from Luf-
thansa, whether in the United States, in the Federal Republic of Germany, or else-
where." Id. at 51.
"8 See, e.g., S & S Screw Machine Co. v. Cosa Corp., 647 F. Supp. at 614 (de-
clining to adopt "the geographic fiction" that the FRCP require only gathering or
preparation of evidence, but not its production, on foreign soil). See also Brief of the
Republic of France as amicus curiae in Support of Petitioners, Societe Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Iowa (No. 85-1695),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986). In its brief the French government asserted not
only that the Convention applies to parties before a United States court but that, re-
gardless of where production of documents actually takes place, preparation for such
documentary discovery would take place on French soil and therefore such discovery,
absent French assistance under the Convention, would infringe on French sovereignty.
Brief at 12-17. See also Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland as amicus curiae in Support of Petitioners, Societe Na-
tionale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Iowa, in
which the United Kingdom stated that French interests would be implicated, regardless
of whether documents are to be produced in the United States. Id. at 16-17.
In their joint brief in the same case, supra note 79, the United States and the SEC
also rejected the lower court's rationale that the Convention was meant only to apply to
evidence produced abroad, as opposed to evidence gathered abroad and produced in the
United States. Id. at 10. The SEC, however, argued that the required use of the Hague
Convention should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and rejected a mandatory
"first-use" rule. Id. at 6.
87 55 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987) (No. 85-1695) (oral argument on be-
half of parties and amici on Jan. 14, 1987).
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If the Eighth Circuit were upheld in Aerospatiale, and assuming
that the foreign accounting firm was not a party but the subsidiary
was, the SEC might be able to use the FRCP directly for obtaining
documents of the subsidiary to be produced in the United States and for
compelling officers, directors, and certain designated employees of the
subsidiary to testify in the United States. However, the SEC would
probably be required to use the Hague Convention to obtain both docu-
mentary evidence and testimony from the foreign accountant, who
would not be amenable to service here and all of whose evidence would
be given abroad. Moreover, if testimony from subsidiary personnel
were to be given in Country X, the SEC might be required to employ
the Hague Convention procedures to obtain such testimony. If the Su-
preme Court reverses the Eighth Circuit, the SEC would presumably
be required to employ the Hague Convention procedures with respect
to both parties and third-party witnesses. In such event, it is possible
that the Court would provide guidance as to whether and under what
circumstances the FRCP could be used where the Hague Convention
procedures failed to produce discovery considered reasonable by a
United States court.
Another factor bearing on the ability of the SEC to gather evi-
dence abroad for an investigation, an administrative proceeding, or a
civil injunctive proceeding may be the blocking statute enacted by
Country X. In our hypothetical, Country X's blocking statute may be
self-executing, as is the French statute, or, alternatively, it may be exe-
cuted by the executive branch of the government, as is the case with the
British statute.
Article Ibis of the French blocking statute88 provides that
subject to treaties, international agreements and laws and
regulations in effect, no person may request, seek to obtain
or transmit, in writing, orally, or in any other form, docu-
ments or information of an economic, commercial, industrial,
financial or technical nature, intended for the constitution of
evidence in connection with pending or prospective foreign
judicial or administrative proceedings (emphasis added).89
The penalty for violation of Article Ibis is fine or imprisonment or
88 Law No. 80-538, [1980] Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.]
1799, [1980] Dalloz-Sirey, Ligislation [D.S.L.] 285.
89 Article 1 of the French statute prohibits communication of documents or infor-
mation of an economic, technical, financial, commercial or industrial nature, where
such communication would threaten French sovereignty, security or essential economic
interests. It seems unlikely that the information sought in the hypothetical would impli-
cate Article 1.
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both. Article lbis applies to any request for information of the kind
described, if such information is to be used in the proceedings identi-
fied. Although Article Ibis does not mention foreign public authorities
specifically, it applies to requests from such public authorities as the
SEC as well as from courts.9" It is significant that Article Ibis makes it
a crime to seek to obtain as well as to transmit documents or informa-
tion. Article Ibis also covers subject matter relevant to the hypothetical
and would prevent, except for what could be gathered through the
Hague Convention, the SEC from taking testimony or obtaining evi-
dence intended for use in any judicial or administrative proceedings
from "any person," encompassing the foreign accountant and the sub-
sidiary, its agents, employees and representatives. The French blocking
statute operates automatically and, as a criminal enactment, cannot be
the subject of any form of waiver. 1
Under the British blocking statute, the Protection of Trading In-
terests Act (1980 Act), 2 if it appears to the Secretary of State that a
person in the United Kingdom has been or may be required to produce
to a court, tribunal, or authority of an overseas country any commercial
document or information to be compiled from such documents,93 the
Secretary may prohibit compliance. The Secretary could thus intervene
to prevent compliance with a SEC subpoena, as well as with a discov-
ery request.94 The Secretary is given considerable discretion as to the
directive he may issue. Those failing to comply with a directive of the
Secretary are subject to a fine.95
Although the Hague Convention and the Evidence (Proceedings in
Other Jurisdictions) Act (1975 Act)9" would apparently allow the tak-
90 See Herzog, Current Developments: The 1980 French Law on Documents and
Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 384 (1981).
91 See Brief of the Republic of France as amicus curiae in Societe Nationale In-
dustrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Iowa, supra note
86, at 17.
92 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. "Trade" includes "any activ-
ity carried on in the course of a business of any description .. . ." Id. § 1(6).
'3 "'Commercial document' and 'commercial information' mean respectively a
document or information relating to a business of any description .... " Id. § 2(6).
94 The Secretary may issue his direction prohibiting compliance if the require-
ment from the court or authority (i) infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom;
(ii) is prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom; (iii) would, if complied
with, be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom; (iv) would, if complied
with, prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and the government of another
country; (v) is made otherwise than for the purposes of civil or criminal proceedings
which have been instituted in the other country; (vi) is not restricted to particular docu-
ments; or (vii) requires publication of any document or information that is character-
ized in (i) through (iv) above. Id. § 2(1)-(3).
95 Id. § 3(2).
9 The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, ch. 34. See supra
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ing of evidence for a contemplated proceeding, the Secretary of State
could, under the 1980 Act, prohibit compliance where the proceedings
are contemplated but have not been instituted. Therefore, in addition to
the limitations already provided to discovery by the 1975 Act, the 1980
Act provides other potential grounds for prohibiting the SEC from ob-
taining evidence from the subsidiary or the foreign accountant, were
either a "person in the United Kingdom. ' '97 Section 4 of the 1980 Act
provides that British courts shall not comply with a request from a
foreign court under the 1975 Act, under which the Hague Convention
is implemented, if the Secretary of State finds that the request infringes
the jurisdiction of, or is prejudicial to, the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom. 8
We have assumed thus far that the corporation, the subsidiary,
and the foreign accountant have not consented to produce documents
and have not been willing to testify. However, even if they did consent
to cooperate, blocking statutes might prevent such cooperation.99 A
blocking statute such as the French model is absolute, making it a
crime for parties or witnesses to consent unless such persons are volun-
tarily providing documents and testimony in compliance with the
Hague Convention. If the Hague Convention did not apply, as it does
not at the investigatory stage and with respect to administrative pro-
ceedings, the blocking statute could apparently prevent the SEC from
obtaining the information it required."' The 1980 Act allows the Brit-
ish Secretary of State considerable discretion to tailor a direction under
Section 2, which specifically permits the Secretary to take into consider-
note 78.
9 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 2(1).
9 The Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, grants the Secretary similar powers to
prevent disclosure to "any person in a country or territory outside the United King-
dom" of "information relating to the business or other affairs of any person" obtained
either by a governmental financial regulatory authority or a private self-regulatory or-
ganization. Id. § 181(1)-(3). Knowing disclosure of information in violation of an order
by the Secretary is a criminal offense punishable by fine or up to two years imprison-
ment. Id. § 181(7). The Act's legislative history suggests that its purpose is not to
prevent foreign financial regulators from gaining access to information, but to allow the
Secretary to prevent information being used in foreign legal proceedings unconnected
with regulation of financial services. 479 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 748 (1986). On
the other hand, the Secretary would apparently have authority to block the transmittal
of information that the entities had agreed by contract to provide to United States enti-
ties or authorities.
"' In this respect, blocking statutes are distinguishable from secrecy laws, which
generally (although not always) are waivable by the person about whom information is
sought.
'00 To the degree that the SEC wishes to avoid the blocking statute and utilize the
Hague Convention, it will have yet one more incentive to bring a civil action rather
than an administrative action. This may mean seeking to allege fraud, as opposed to
confining its allegation to non-fraudulent disclosure violations.
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ation the consent of a party or witness to give evidence.
United States courts have sometimes been willing, in spite of a
blocking statute, to use the FRCP to issue orders compelling discovery
and to sanction noncompliance under Rule 37.1"' The Supreme Court
has so far addressed the issue only in Societe Internationale Pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers."2 In that
case the Court reversed a lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's case.
The dismissal had been imposed as a sanction against the plaintiff,
which was blocked by Swiss secrecy laws from complying with discov-
ery requests. The Court indicated that a showing of bad faith on the
part of the plaintiff would have been an important consideration in the
imposition of such a sanction but that no such showing had been
made.'0 3 The Court did suggest in dictum that in a trial on the merits,
the court below might be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable to
the plaintiff in the absence of documentary evidence to the contrary.""
Following Rogers, courts have often required a showing of good faith
before refusing to sanction a noncomplying party. Such good faith may
be demonstrated by, inter alia, efforts to secure an exemption from the
foreign government and efforts to comply with the court's order outside
of the territorial reach of the blocking statute." 5 Courts have also often
used the balancing test of section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States'016 to decide whether an
101 Presumably a court that was willing to compel discovery in the face of a block-
ing statute would be willing to do so against a nonparty as well as a party but, as noted
in Section 4, absent foreign judicial assistance, federal courts have little power to com-
pel the testimony of witnesses who are foreign nationals located abroad and who are
not amenable to service of a subpoena.
22 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
103 Id. at 208-09.
104 Id. at 212-13.
105 Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. at 526. In Graco, the court, in issu-
ing a discovery order, indicated that good faith efforts on the part of the party expected
to raise the French blocking statute as a defense would be the key factor in determining
which, if any, sanctions would ultimately be applied. See also Ohio v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.) (upholding the imposition of sanctions that precluded
Andersen from opposing Ohio's claims on two matters and that assessed Andersen the
cost of the motion to compel and noting that Andersen had acted in bad faith and that
the balancing factors were heavily on Ohio's side), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978);
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992, 996-97
(10th Cir. 1977) (employing Roger's good faith standard and balancing factors under
section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965) to relieve petitioner of contempt sanctions where Canadian law forbade produc-
tion of documents).
108 Section 40 provides that:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon
the part of a person, each state is required by international law to con-
sider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction,
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order should issue or sanctions should be applied for noncompliance
with an order.
10 7
The combination of a balancing of interests under section 40 and
the application of a good faith test on a case-by-case basis has led to an
inconsistent pattern of enforcement of orders from United States courts
for discovery of documents held abroad. However, more often than not,
United States courts have found the balance weighted on the side of
United States interests. The Aerospatiale case now before the Supreme
in the light of such factors as: (a) vital national interests of each of the
states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent en-
forcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent to which
the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d)
the nationality of the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by
action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance
with the rule prescribed by that state.
RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965).
Tentative Draft No. 7 (1986) for a revised Restatement attempts, in section 437,
to deal specifically with foreign discovery requests. Among the factors a judge should
consider under section 437 are the importance of the documents or information, the
specificity of the request, the origin of the documents, the extent to which each state's
interests are implicated, and the possibility of securing the information through alterna-
tive means. Where there is a conflicting foreign law, under section 437, a court may
enter an order requiring a party to make a good faith effort to comply with the discov-
ery requests. Failure to comply should not be punished with contempt, dismissal or
default if there has been a good faith effort. However, adverse finding of fact is permis-
sible even if there has been such good faith.
107 See, e.g., In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 997; Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d at 127.
Several early decisions in the Second Circuit appeared to view foreign law prohibitions
as an absolute bar to ordering inspection or production of documents, at least in the
case of third-party witnesses. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d
Cir. 1962); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank
of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948
(1960).
That circuit, however, has subsequently adopted a balancing test in which the
prohibition of foreign law is only one of several factors to be considered. See, e.g.,
Trade Development Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding
that on balance the material sought was not important enough to the case to require
disclosure in violation of Swiss bank secrecy laws); United States v. First National City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding on balance a contempt citation against a
bank and its vice president, which citation imposed a daily fine on the bank and 60
days imprisonment on the vice president for failure to comply with an ongoing grand
jury inquiry into antitrust violations, even though compliance might subject the bank to
civil liability in Germany); see also United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817
(11 th Cir. 1984) (upholding sanctions to force compliance with grand jury subpoena
after finding bad faith on part of bank and finding U.S. interest in narcotics convictions
outweighs interest of Cayman Islands in bank secrecy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1985); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (hold-
ing that on balance the Swiss bank was deliberately using Swiss secrecy laws to prevent
discovery and ordering the bank to comply with certain demands by the SEC for infor-
mation). In Banca Della Svizzera, the bank eventually obtained a waiver of confidenti-
ality from its customers.
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Court involves the French blocking statute, which, petitioners claimed
below, prevents compliance with discovery requests outside of the
Hague Convention.1"8 The Court's decision in Aerospatiale may pro-
vide lower courts with more specific guidance than that offered by Rog-
ers with respect to the weight to be accorded by United States courts to
foreign blocking statutes.
The current attitude of United States courts toward blocking stat-
utes and the attitude of some United States courts toward the Hague
Convention has antagonized the governments upon whose corporate
and individual citizens are imposed the orders and resulting sanctions,
which may include adverse findings against the party or even fines and
imprisonment until compliance is forthcoming. Indeed, such action by
United States courts and their sometimes expansive assertion of juris-
diction is, arguably, a unilateral action of the kind that was so much
resented when waiver-by-conduct was proposed.1"' To the degree that
sanctions are not effective, the SEC and other United States parties
may not be able to make their strongest case; to the degree that they are
effective, they create an antagonistic international atmosphere in which
foreign governments are unwilling to cooperate. Therefore, even assum-
ing that, using the Rule 37 enforcement powers of the federal courts
(and the Hague Convention where possible or necessary), the SEC suc-
ceeded in obtaining at least some of the evidence it sought, the SEC is
unlikely to consider the solution as wholly satisfactory in all cases. In
the context of the hypothetical under discussion, a Rule 37 sanction
seems a drastic remedy to contemplate when, as is likely to be the case,
the ultimate outcome of the SEC's enforcement activities will be the
requirement that the corporation correct its financial statements. More-
over, in general, the SEC may be loath to use a case-by-case method to
enforce its requests for documents and testimony, both because it may
be inefficient and because it is likely to have deleterious effects on the
amicable working relationships the SEC desires to maintain with for-
eign governments and their enforcement authorities. Finally, neither
the Hague Convention nor the FRCP will necessarily permit the SEC
to gain access to all of the evidence it may require in a civil injunctive
action. Where the SEC is carrying out a formal order of investigation
or conducting an administrative proceeding, the Hague Convention will
be unavailable, and the power of United States courts will be of limited
use in gaining access to information located abroad.
10o Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d at 126-27.
..9 See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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5. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
5.1. Introduction
It should be emphasized that debate over international problems in
the securities area has thus far taken place under circumstances in
which the SEC makes most of the requests for assistance. As foreign
markets, particularly those of Japan and the United Kingdom, begin to
rival the United States markets, the SEC is likely to be the recipient of
an increasing number of requests for assistance. In considering what
the SEC and foreign nations will want from future bilateral and/or
multilateral assistance agreements, both sides should keep in mind that
the necessity for assistance is likely to become a two-way street. There-
fore, although agreements for assistance may be a more tangible benefit
to the SEC in the short run, both the United States and foreign nations
are likely to desire such assistance in the long run. In that regard, Con-
gress must give the SEC explicit authority to cooperate with foreign
nations in situations where no violation of United States law is sus-
pected. It is more appropriate to give such authority to the SEC than to
the Department of Justice, because of the SEC's experience in securi-
ties matters.
This section briefly lists some possible solutions to international
problems in the securities regulation area. The three most promising
options - consent, bilateral agreements, and multilateral agreements,
are discussed in depth in the remainder of this section.
(1) Status Quo. The SEC could continue to rely upon pressure on
the United States issuer and the United States accountant to achieve its
goals and continue to obtain evidence held overseas on a case-by-case
basis. This "solution" presupposes a belief that problems of access to
foreign-based evidence are relatively isolated and require no unusual
measures to solve. Although others may disagree, it is apparent that the
SEC does not view the problem as isolated. Also, these methods are
unlikely to provide help to the SEC at the investigatory stage of its
enforcement activities.
(2) Duplicate Records. The SEC could require that a United
States issuer maintain in the United States duplicate copies of its for-
eign subsidiary's books and records. This solution would be enormously
expensive and therefore unnecessarily burdensome on corporations.
With respect to the foreign accountants, the United States account-
ant could be required to maintain copies of the work papers of a for-
eign accountant if it relies on the report of such accountant but assumes
responsibility for the report (that is, does not disclose its reliance). This
requirement does not appear to be especially burdensome, but it would
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not solve the problem of access to the testimony of the foreign
accountants.
(3) Foreign Accountants. The SEC could promulgate rules re-
quiring United States accountants to cease relying on foreign account-
ants. This solution seems impracticable because of workload and diffi-
culty in gaining access to books and records.
(4) Disclosure. The SEC could require the United States account-
ant, as part of its auditor's letter included in annual reports of a domes-
tic corporation, to disclose the percentage of the issuer's assets covered
by a foreign accountant's audit. This disclosure would state that access
to the books and records of foreign accountants could be limited for
enforcement purposes. Such a solution is unlikely to be acceptable to
the SEC's Division of Enforcement, which would still want to investi-
gate when it believes that the disclosure made is false or misleading,
and would therefore desire access to the testimony and work papers of
the foreign accountants.
(5) Rule 2(e) Proceedings. The SEC might attempt to bring a
Rule 2(e) proceeding, as discussed in Section 3.5, against the foreign
accountant. However, this would not solve problems of access to testi-
mony or documents; indeed, it could exacerbate them. Any attempt to
bring such a proceeding would also raise jurisdictional issues.
The SEC could also conceivably bring a Rule 2(e) proceeding
against the United States accountant on the theory that such accountant
"improperly relied" on the foreign accountant. In such a proceeding,
the SEC could argue that a failure by the United States accountant to
produce the testimony and work papers of the foreign accountant
should create a presumption that the foreign accountant's testimony
would be adverse to the United States accountant. This result could
discourage United States accountants from relying on foreign account-
ants. Even if this were a desirable outcome, this type of Rule 2(e) pro-
ceeding could raise issues of due process and would not necessarily alle-
viate the SEC's broader concerns over its ability to obtain documents
and testimony from foreigners.
(6) Section 21(a) Foreign Restricted List. The SEC could make
more frequent use of section 21(a) reports on foreign accountants or of
a publication similar to the foreign restricted list. n1 However, this
would not solve the Commission's basic concern over access to evidence
abroad.
(7) Consent. The SEC could require consent of issuers and ac-
countants in various circumstances. Consent as a solution is discussed
110 See supra Section 3.6.
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in detail in Section 5.2 below.
(8) International Agreements. The SEC (or the United States
Government) might negotiate assistance agreements under which sub-
poenas issued will be enforced and documents delivered. Such agree-
ments would provide standards for providing assistance and/or would
use the services of a third party to determine when assistance would be
provided. Negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements is dis-
cussed in detail in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below.
5.2. Use of Consents
As the earlier discussion illustrates, the SEC has expressed serious
concerns over the differing legal standards for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion and the production of evidence that currently exist between the
United States legal system and overseas legal systems. One possible so-
lution to the problems raised by such differing standards is the creation
by the SEC of some type of consent requirement, which could be re-
quired of issuers and/or accountants. As discussed below, the imposi-
tion of a consent requirement by the SEC is likely to produce an ad-
verse foreign reaction because a consent requirement, however mild, is
by definition a unilateral United States action that excludes other na-
tions from the process. However, we will assume for purposes of dis-
cussion that the SEC nonetheless chooses to consider the creation of a
consent requirement. The discussion below focuses on (i) types of con-
sents now required, (ii) areas where the SEC could expand consent
requirements in the future111 and (iii) possible foreign reactions to SEC
attempts to require consents affecting non-United States entities."" 2
Consents have previously been used in the United States securities
law area, both in the text of specific SEC rules and in no-action letters.
The mildest type of consent currently required by the SEC is a consent
to jurisdiction and appointment of an agent for service of process. For
example, nonresident issuers engaging in a Regulation A offering, or
any nonresident directors or officers of an issuer in a Regulation A
offering, must file such a consent, naming the SEC as agent for service
"I1 This article does not discuss the area of negotiated consent agreements between
the SEC and private individuals or entities. While such agreements may be helpful in
the occasional individual case, they are not a comprehensive long-term solution.
112 This discussion assumes that the SEC's primary motivation for imposing a
consent requirement is to enable it to obtain evidence abroad if it subsequently seeks to
investigate parties that have been compelled to consent. This section does not deal with
voluntary cooperation at the pretrial discovery stage, where Articles 15-17 of the
Hague Convention, supra note 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, do allow voluntary discovery,
even under the terms of some blocking statutes.
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
of process."1" Similarly, Exchange Act Rule 15bl-51" requires nonresi-
dent brokers or dealers and any nonresident general partners or man-
aging agents of brokers or dealers to furnish a consent to service of
process designating the SEC as agent for service. Nonresident invest-
ment. advisers are also required to designate the SEC as agent for ser-
vice of process."1 5 Most recently, the Commission proposed for com-
ment Rule 6c-9"' under the Investment Company Act, which would,
under certain conditions, permit a foreign bank or the bank's finance
subsidiary to offer or sell its own debt securities or nonvoting preferred
stock in the United States without registering as an investment com-
pany. As one condition of the proposed exemption, the foreign bank
and any foreign finance subsidiary would be required to file with the
SEC a form appointing an agent located in the United States for service
of process."'
If the SEC seeks to expand the use of a consent requirement as a
condition precedent to conducting particular activities in the United
States, such expansion could take the following form: The SEC could
require that any United States corporation whose foreign subsidiary
contributed a specified percentage of the United States issuer's earnings
must cause that subsidiary to file (as part of the parent's annual report
to the SEC on Form 10-K) a consent to service of process designating
the SEC as agent for service. Such a consent could be similar in form to
the ones in Rule 15bl-5 and proposed Rule 6c-9 noted above. Once
personal jurisdiction is obtained pursuant to such a consent, a court
having subject matter jurisdiction can impose sanctions on a party
whose consent has been so given.
If a consent to service of process does not appear sufficient to the
SEC, more far-reaching types of consents could be proposed. For ex-
ample, the Commission could require, as part of the Form 10-K, that
the parent cause its foreign subsidiary to file a consent agreeing to pro-
vide books and records requested by the SEC if a formal order of inves-
tigation is entered against the parent." 8 An even more drastic action
Ila 17 C.F.R. § 230.262 (1986).
114 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-5 (1986).
"1 17 C.F.R. § 275.0-2 (1986)
118 51 Fed. Reg. 34,221 (1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.6c-9) (proposed
Aug. 5, 1986).
117 Id. at 34,225.
118 Consents whereby United States issuers agree tW cause (or use their "best ef-
forts" to cause) foreign subsidiaries to take certain actions or provide certain documents
have also been entered into by the SEC in the no-action letter context. A recent exam-
ple is the SEC's 1986 no-action letter with respect to Citicorp/Vickers da Costa Securi-
ties, Inc., in which Citicorp agreed, inter alia, to (i) designate its General Counsel's
office in New York as agent for service of process for any SEC action involving certain
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would be for the SEC to require, as part of the Form 10-K, that the
parent cause the officers and directors of its foreign subsidiary to file a
consent agreeing to appear in the United States to testify, as well as
agreeing to produce books and records, if the parent company becomes
the subject of a SEC formal order of investigation. The annual report
would not be considered to have been properly filed and completed un-
less the consents the SEC chose to require were included. The SEC
would essentially be exercising its authority to mandate the content of a
filing.
With respect to accountants, analogous requirements could be im-
posed. If a United States accountant relies on a foreign accountant in
preparing the parent's consolidated financial statements for the annual
report (Form 10-K), the United States accountant could be required to
cause the foreign accountant to (i) appoint the SEC, as agent for service
of process, (ii) consent to provide books and records if so requested by
the SEC, and/or (iii) consent to testify in the United States, and agree
to provide books and records, in a SEC formal investigation.
Use of consent does not eliminate potential conflicts between (i) a
United States court's demands for production of documents pursuant to
the terms of the consent and (ii) a foreign blocking statute precluding
the transmittal of such documents. Also, the use of consent as a condi-
tion precedent to ensure "voluntary" cooperation at the investigatory
stage is likely to be seen as intrusive and unilateral by foreign govern-
ments, as the "waiver-by-conduct" experience illustrates. The "waiver-
by-conduct" approach was proposed in July 1984. Under this concept,
the sale or purchase of securities on a United States market, directly or
indirectly, would be deemed by the SEC to constitute a waiver of any
protections otherwise provided by foreign secrecy statutes.119 Such a
purchase or sale would constitute "an implied consent to disclosure of
information and evidence relevant to the transaction for purposes of any
Commission investigation, administrative proceeding or action for in-
junctive relief authorized by the federal securities laws that may arise
out of the transaction. '"120 Also, such a purchase or sale would consti-
tute the appointment of the United States broker executing the transac-
tion as an agent for service of process and "a consent to the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction by the United States courts and the Commis-
foreign subsidiaries of Citicorp; and (ii) use its best efforts to obtain necessary customer
consents authorizing certain foreign subsidiaries to provide requested information to the
SEC (Aug. 31, 1986).
119 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-21,186 (issued July 30, 1984), 49
Fed. Reg. 31,300 (1984). This was a concept release, not a proposal for rulemaking.
120 Id. at 31,300.
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sion."'' The release states that the waiver-by-conduct approach does
not address problems resulting from blocking statutes or problems aris-
ing in cases involving foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations
or foreign broker-dealers or accountants.
Most comments received in response to this release were nega-
tive.122 The commentators felt that a waiver-by-conduct concept would
(i) constitute an extraterritorial extension of United States law, (ii)
drive business away from United States markets, and (iii) raise ques-
tions of enforceability.12
In addition to their objections to unilateral United States action,
foreigners are often concerned by the ease with which the SEC can
meet statutory standards for commencing an investigation. Especially in
the early stages of such an investigation, foreigners may fear that the
Commission is conducting a "fishing expedition" based on mere suspi-
cion. 24 At least some of the concern in this area may stem from the fact
that not all foreign nations authorize their securities agencies to investi-
gate based solely on suspicion of wrongdoing. The United States, how-
ever, deems it necessary to grant the SEC broad powers of investigation
to ensure that the flow of information needed for efficient markets is
maintained.
Another reason for foreign concern over SEC-imposed consents,
including milder types such as consent to service of process, is the per-
ceived inability of the SEC to protect the confidentiality of any docu-
ments/information provided to the SEC by non-United States entities.
Even if the SEC is willing to grant confidential treatment to some types
of documents/information obtained by consent, under current law the
granting of such treatment does not preclude disclosure in response to a
congressional request and does not prevent a private party from re-
questing documents/information under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).125
The FOIA generally creates a public right of access to United
States federal agency records except when such records are protected
from disclosure by any one of nine exemptions. Exemptions may apply
to entire records, or only to portions thereof. Aside from Exemption
7(A), 2' the FOIA exemptions most likely to be of some utility to issu-
121 Id.
122 See Mann & Sullivan, supra note 66, at 513.
123 Id.
124 See supra section 3.1.
125 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
126 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1982). As discussed supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text, this exemption will not prevent the release of information once an enforcement
proceeding is concluded. Therefore, if information is provided to the SEC at the investi-
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ers (whether foreign or domestic) are Exemption 4, which exempts
from disclosure under the FOIA "trade secrets and commercial or fi-
nancial information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial"; 1217 and Exemption 7(C), which exempts from disclosure "investi-
gatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" if production of
such records would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy ..... ,12' In addition to their concerns about the possibility of
a FOIA request, 2 ' non-United States entities may also be concerned by
the possibility of a request for information by the Internal Revenue
Service or the United States Congress. In this respect, and to a large
extent with respect to FOIA requests, the SEC can provide no absolute
assurance that particular information will remain confidential.
Overall, SEC use of consents as a condition precedent is likely to
be seen overseas as a unilateral United States intrusion.' Even the
milder alternative of consent to service of process does not give suffi-
cient regard to comity between nations. Also, as a practical matter,
when the SEC actually seeks to obtain documents or testimony from
abroad, it is likely that, notwithstanding the existence of a prior con-
sent, the Commission will need some amount of cooperation from the
foreign government whose citizens are involved in the SEC investiga-
tion. Without cooperation the conflict will continue to exist between
United States courts seeking to impose sanctions and foreign statutes
precluding the production of evidence.'
The crucial fact is that any SEC-imposed consent requirement, no
matter how narrow in scope, is a unilateral United States action. It is
such unilateral action, particularly when followed by the imposition of
sanctions by United States courts, that is likely to produce a foreign
backlash, perhaps via the passage of blocking statutes or secrecy laws
by countries that do not currently have them. Even absent the possibil-
ity of retaliation by foreign nations, we would not recommend the ex-
panded use of SEC-required consents because of the long-range vital
gation stage pursuant to a consent, Exemption 7(A) will not prevent its release pursu-
ant to a FOIA request once the Commission has either concluded any enforcement
proceeding, or has completed its investigation and determined not to bring a proceeding.
.1 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982).
128 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982).
129 Because a private party may make a FOIA request at any time, a written
request for confidential treatment should be submitted to the SEC at the time docu-
ments/information are first submitted to it. Should the SEC subsequently receive a
FOIA request, it may ask that the request for confidential treatment be substantiated
before its staff renders a decision on the FOIA request and related confidential treat-
ment request.
120 Depending on the scope of such consents, concerns over the SEC's authority to
require them could also be raised.
' See supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
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importance of establishing a cooperative relationship between the SEC
and foreign securities officials.
5.3. Bilateral Agreements
Even if some international enforcement problems could be handled
by consent, improvement of international enforcement cooperation is a
far more promising area to explore. Given increased internationaliza-
tion of the securities markets, greater cooperation at a government-to-
government level is becoming more essential.
Two basic types of bilateral agreements have been developed: (i)
formal bilateral assistance treaties1 2 and (ii) informal arrangements,' 33
as typified by the 1982 Swiss MOU"' and the 1986 SEC-Japan 35
and SEC-United Kingdom' 36 agreements. However, informal agree-
ments, including MOU's, have the advantage of not requiring ratifica-
tion by either the United States Senate or the equivalent foreign entity.
At least some informal agreements have the further advantage, from the
SEC's perspective, of not involving other United States government
agencies in the negotiations.
An informal understanding in the disclosure area would have the
additional advantage of bringing together the SEC and its equivalent
regulator in Country X in a more cooperative relationship. This, in and
of itself, would be a significant accomplishment in view of our assump-
tion that Country X not only has no bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments with the SEC governing requests for documents, but also has a
blocking statute. Ideally, the SEC and Country X's regulators would
first reach an informal arrangement covering SEC requests for docu-
ments (i) during preliminary SEC investigations of disclosure viola-
tions,' (ii) during the pretrial discovery stage and (iii) possibly at the
..2 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confed-
eration on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, entered into force Jan. 23, 1977,
United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
' Such informal agreements are essentially a statement of intent by the
signatories.
'3 Supra note 54.
'3 Memorandum of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Informa-
tion, May 23, 1986, United States-Japan, 25 I.L.M. 1429 (1986).
136 Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United Kingdom Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Securities and Between the United
States Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the United Kingdom Department
of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, United States-
United Kingdom, 25 I.L.M. 1431 (1986) [hereinafter SEC-United Kingdom agree-
ment].
"' As discussed infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text, there are likely to be
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administrative proceeding stage. This practical short-term step could
then be followed by the negotiation of either a formal, more compre-
hensive treaty or a treaty supplemented by a MOU. It should be noted
that securities laws issues are likely to constitute only one aspect of
formal treaty negotiations between the United States and Country X,
particularly given foreign concerns with the Internal Revenue Service,
the Federal Trade Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.
In seeking to persuade Country X to begin negotiations on an
agreement that will, as a minimum, provide for greater assistance at the
investigatory stage, the SEC could stress that the current situation,
where there is no bilateral agreement with Country X and therefore
virtually no possibility of assistance at the investigatory stage, impels
the SEC toward earlier use of its most stringent remedy, a civil action
filed in federal court. In effect, the SEC's inability to get sufficient help
from Country X at the investigatory stage, or for an administrative pro-
ceeding, forces it to "go public" and file a lawsuit in federal court if it
believes it has a case. As noted earlier, potential defendants presumably
would wish to avoid this publicity, especially if they believe themselves
innocent."'
Regardless of the type of bilateral agreement negotiated, the SEC
is likely to have certain minimum objectives:
i. The SEC would want Country X to designate a central author-
ity to process SEC requests for documents and information. This would
also presumably benefit Country X because, as discussed below, the
SEC should be willing to agree to facilitate Country X's requests for
documents and information.
ii. An understanding should be reached that the SEC can use any
evidence obtained in its investigations, at the pretrial discovery stage,
and in subsequent injunctive or administrative proceedings, even if it
makes no criminal referral. As our disclosure hypothetical illustrates,
improvement in the level of cooperation at the investigatory stage will
be of primary importance to the SEC. The SEC might state to Country
X's negotiators that an agreement which permitted SEC use of materi-
als at the civil suit stage but not for administrative proceedings would
impel the SEC to use the more severe remedy of a civil suit. Foreign
concerns over SEC "fishing expeditions" and the lack of foreign famili-
arity with United States administrative proceedings will likely make
this use of evidence area a difficult point to negotiate.
several types of violations (including disclosure violations) the SEC would seek to in-
clude in any agreement.
138 See supra note 29.
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Foreign lack of familiarity with administrative proceedings is a
particular SEC concern in the disclosure area. As discussed earlier, the
SEC is determined to ensure accurate disclosure in order to help main-
tain efficient trading markets.13 When such disclosure violations are
not fraudulent, the SEC uses administrative proceedings as the vehicle
to compel correction of such violations.
iii. The most difficult area to negotiate, even informally, may be
the standard that must be met (e.g., relevancy, materiality) before a
request for assistance in obtaining documents/information will be
honored. In developing such a standard, at least five possibilities could
be considered. First, a materiality test could be developed. 4 ' In the
financial disclosure area, this might be structured as a requirement that
the financials of a foreign subsidiary have a specified percentage impact
(e.g., fifteen percent) on the United States issuer's consolidated
financials. Second, a relevancy test.4 ' could be used. Such a relevancy
test could require, for example, that the information be essential to the
SEC's ability to withstand a motion to dismiss, or it could require the
SEC (and Country X for its requests) to certify that the information
being requested is significant. 42 A third option could be to require that
the information sought be sufficiently material as to be "essential" to
the SEC's ultimate presentation of its case. This test, like the motion to
dismiss standard, may be more appropriate at the pretrial discovery
stage because the SEC probably cannot meet these standards at the in-
vestigatory stage. A fourth option would be to require that the violation
under investigation also be a violation of either the civil or criminal law
of Country X, although the SEC, given its concerns over the "dual
criminality" concept, may be unwilling to go this far.'43 A fifth option
would be the development of a bilateral letters of request procedure,
analogous to that of the Hague Convention, which would be available
at the investigatory stage. However, use of this fifth option still requires
development of some type of standard.
The most practical alternative appears to be an agreement that
some combination of the first four factors (relevancy, materiality, essen-
139 See Section 2.
140 "Material" is admittedly a subjective term. For example, SEC Rule 405 has
defined the term as "matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security reg-
istered." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986).
141 The United States discovery standard of "relevant to the subject matter" is set
forth in FFD. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
142 Such a certification concept is employed in the SEC-United Kingdom agree-
ment, supra note 136.
143 See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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tial to the SEC's case, and foreign law violation) must apply before a
request for assistance will be honored. An agreement could also be
structured so that meeting any one of several factors would be suffi-
cient. The combination of factors to be met could also be varied accord-
ing to the particular type of United States securities law violation being
investigated, and/or according to whether the SEC is at the investiga-
tory or pretrial discovery stage. For example, foreign concerns over the
scope of SEC formal orders may well cause foreign countries to require
tougher standards before a request for assistance at the formal order
stage is honored.
Ideally, from the SEC's viewpoint, Country X would assist any
SEC investigation. However, it is more likely that Country X will only
be willing to assist the SEC when particular types of United States
securities law violations are being investigated. A final potential point
of disagreement could involve who makes the determination of when
the applicable standards for assistance are met. The SEC and Country
X may reach agreement on acceptable standards more readily if the
determination as to when they are met is made by an existing body in
Country X, rather than by the SEC or by Country X's securities au-
thorities. For example, under the Swiss MOU, such a role is performed
by the Swiss Bankers' Association.""' Given Country X's probable dis-
trust of SEC formal orders of investigation, the SEC may have to con-
cede this point and agree to a designated third party making such de-
terminations. Such a third party might also conduct the actual review
of documents following its determination that the standards for assis-
tance had been met.
iv. The SEC may be unwilling to enter any long-term agreement
that requires, for all assistance requests, that the offense under investi-
gation be a crime in both the United States and Country X. This re-
quirement, found in some existing agreements, is typically referred to
as the "dual criminality" concept.1" 5 At least for an interim accord, the
SEC and Country X should attempt to agree on particular categories of
offenses for which requests for assistance will be honored without at-
tempting to resolve the dual criminality problem for all types of of-
fenses. This assumes that there are particular problem areas where the
SEC is most anxious to reach an interim agreement and where Country
X would be willing to provide assistance without requiring dual
criminality.
To achieve a long-term comprehensive assistance agreement, the
144 Swiss MOU, supra note 54, art. III, 22 I.L.M. at 4-6.
14' For a definition and general discussion of "dual criminality," see 6 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGESIT OF INT1ERNATIONAL LAW 773-79 (1968).
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SEC should be willing to agree that although dual criminality will not
be a prerequisite to obtaining assistance for specified categories of of-
fenses, it will be required for offenses not specifically referenced by the
agreement.14 It is simply not realistic for the SEC to expect foreign
146 This is essentially the approach taken in the United States-United Kingdom
Treaty concerning the Cayman Islands (Treaty Between the United States of America
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cay-
man Islands Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed July 3, 1986)
[hereinafter Treaty]. This as yet unratified Treaty defines categories of offenses, includ-
ing "fraudulent securities practices" and "insider trading," for which assistance will be
provided, but offenses not specifically enumerated fall within the scope of the treaty
only if they are punishable by more than one year's imprisonment under the laws of
both the United States and the Cayman Islands.
Article 19 of the Treaty provides:
For the purpose of this Treaty:
3. "Criminal offense" which, except in the case of any matter falling
within sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of this definition, does not include any
conduct or matter which relates directly or indirectly to the regulation,
imposition, calculation or collection of taxes, but subject always to those
exclusions, means:
(a) Any conduct punishable by more than one year's imprisonment
under the laws of both the Requesting and Requested Parties;
(d) Willfully or dishonestly obtaining money, property, or valuable
securities from other persons by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses or statements, whether oral or written, regarding or affecting
benefits available in connection with the laws and regulations relat-
ing to income or other taxes;
(e) Willfully or dishonestly making false statements, whether oral
or written, to government tax authorities (e.g., willfully or dishon-
estly submitting a false income tax return) with respect to any tax
matter arising fr6m the unlawful proceeds of any criminal offense
covered by any other provision of this definition, except sub-para-
graph (f), or willfully or dishonestly failing to make a report to
government tax authorities as required by law in respect of, or to
pay the tax due on, any such unlawful proceeds;
(f) Willfully or dishonestly failing to make to the Government a
report which is required by law to be made to it in respect of an
international transfer of currency or other financial transactions
connected with, arising from or related to the unlawful proceeds of
any criminal offense falling within any provision of this Article, ex-
cept this sub-paragraph or sub-paragraph (e) above;
(g) "Insider trading" which means the offer, purchase, or sale of
securities by any person while in possession of material non-public
information directly or indirectly relating to the securities offered,
purchased, or sold, in breach of a legally binding duty of trust or
confidence;
(h) Fraudulent securities practices, which means the use by any
person willfully or dishonestly of any means, directly or indirectly,
in connection with the offer, purchase or sale of any security:
(i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(ii) dishonestly to make any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
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assistance in every situation where it suspects a violation of United
States securities laws. Such a bifurcated agreement may be advanta-
geous to the SEC as well as Country X, because elimination of the dual
criminality requirement for only certain specified offenses should pro-
vide flexibility to both sides.
There may also be types of offenses a foreign government wishes
to investigate for which the SEC would be unwilling to provide assis-
tance because, for example, it might believe that the foreign government
was harassing a person or entity for political reasons. 147 For example,
the United States-United Kingdom agreement concerning the Cayman
Islands (not yet ratified) excludes "a political offense" 4" from the cate-
order to make the statement made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which it was made, not misleading; or
(iii) dishonestly to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person;
147 The SEC would, in fact, be unable to provide assistance if doing so would
violate the due process or other legal rights of a United States citizen.
14 Treaty, supra note 146, art. 3(2)(b). Article 3, which provides limitations on
the assistance to be rendered under the Treaty, reads:
1. The assistance afforded by this Treaty shall not extend to:
(a) any matter which relates directly or indirectly to the regulation,
including the imposition, calculation and collection, of taxes, except
for any matter falling within sub-paragraphs 3(d) and 3(e) of Arti-
cle 19; or
(b) any conduct not punishable by imprisonment of more than one
year.
2. The Central Authority of the Requested Party may deny assistance
where:
(a) the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this
Treaty;
(b) the request relates to a political offense or to an offense under
military law which would not be an offense under ordinary crimi-
nal law; or
(c) the request does not establish that there are reasonable grounds
for believing:
(i) that the criminal offense specified in the request has been
committed; and
(ii) that the information sought relates to the offense and is
located in the territory of the Requested Party.
3. The Central Authority shall deny assistance where the Attorney Gen-
eral of the Requested Party has issued a certificate to the effect that the
execution of the request is contrary to the public interest of the Requested
Party.
4. Before denying assistance pursuant to this Article the Central Author-
ity of the Requested Party shall consult with the Central Authority of the
Requesting Party to consider whether assistance can be given subject to
such conditions as it deems necessary. If the Requesting Party accepts as-
sistance subject to these conditions it shall comply with the conditions.
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gories of offenses for which assistance is available.
Assuming the SEC is willing to recognize that foreign govern-
ments will not agree to provide assistance for all types of United States
securities law violations, the SEC must determine the areas where it
believes foreign assistance is most vital and where it should, therefore,
seek to avoid the imposition of a dual criminality requirement. These
should include offenses involving (i) insider trading, (ii) market manip-
ulation, and (iii) disclosure violations, including false financial state-
ments and periodic reporting violations. However, given foreign con-
cerns over SEC abuse of its formal order authority, foreign
governments may be willing to provide assistance for only those disclos-
ure violations that are fraud-based, at least at the investigatory stage.
This view may change in the long run because, as foreign markets
grow, foreign nations may increasingly share the SEC's concern with
providing accurate information to such trading markets.
In order to reach an agreement, the SEC should demonstrate a
willingness to provide "incentives" to Country X, both to assuage any.
fears about SEC "fishing expeditions" and to demonstrate its recogni-
tion that internationalization will require compromises by the United
States and not just by foreign countries. Possible SEC "concessions," in
addition to the dual criminality issue already discussed, could include
the following:
i. The SEC should at least consider whether "smaller" cases (e.g.,
in terms of dollar value) could be excepted from the agreement. Alter-
natively, different standards could be applied to different sized cases.
Negotiation of such standards could prove to be a sensitive matter, but
the United States and Country X could possibly reach some type of
informal agreement in this area.
ii. The SEC should agree to respond promptly to requests from
foreign nations for assistance. Current bilateral agreements and the
Hague Convention do provide procedures for foreign governments to
obtain evidence in the possession of persons located in the United
States, just as they provide procedures for the SEC to obtain evidence
in the possession of persons located abroad. As discussed above, any
changes to such procedures must leave both sides on an equal footing.
The SEC cannot expect assistance from Country X in obtaining evi-
dence in its investigations unless it is willing to help provide equivalent
assistance to Country X's securities regulators. Assistance cannot be
productive in the long run unless it works effectively both ways. As
internationalization of the securities markets increases, foreign regula-
tors' need for SEC assistance will increase. The SEC must be willing to
provide such assistance, seeking congressional authorization where nec-
[Vol. 9:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss3/4
PAPER PRESENTED: E. GREENE
essary, if it expects foreign regulators to be willing to enter into agree-
ments providing the SEC with the assistance it needs. For example, the
SEC could ask Congress for authority to obtain a formal order of inves-
tigation on behalf of those foreign governments with which the United
States has signed a bilateral treaty providing for mutual assistance.
Another issue is the sharing of information in the SEC's posses-
sion. The SEC has already delegated to its staff authority to grant "for-
eign governmental authorities" access to its files concerning nonpublic
investigations. 49 Given the SEC's apparent readiness to assist foreign
securities authorities, the SEC should be willing to negotiate the devel-
opment of mechanisms to provide swift SEC action on such access re-
quests. For example, the SEC's agreements with Japan and the United
Kingdom provide for such SEC assistance.
A more difficult question is what the SEC will do if it receives a
foreign request for information in its possession concerning a matter in
which no SEC investigation has actually taken place. If the facts indi-
cate possible United States securities law violations, the Commission
can authorize a formal order of investigation and provide the foreign
government with access to the information obtained in the investigation
under the access procedures mentioned above. However, if the SEC has
no basis to suspect violation(s) of United States securities laws, it can-
not currently obtain a formal order on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment.150 It may be necessary for the SEC to seek legislation authorizing
it to conduct investigations in specified circumstances, pursuant to a
formal order, on behalf of foreign governments which are equally will-
ing to investigate on the SEC's behalf. This would go beyond an agree-
ment in which assistance is provided simply to execute requests for pro-
duction of evidence or to compel testimony.
iii. As discussed above, the SEC may need to agree to limit the
scope of any agreement to particular types of violations, and will almost
certainly have to agree that some entity other than itself will determine
when the agreement's standards for assistance will apply. Also, the
standards governing requests for assistance may need to be different at
the formal order stage because of foreign concerns over possible SEC
"fishing expeditions." '' 1
149 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.19b, 200.30-4(a)(7) (delegation to Director of Division
of Enforcement); § 200.21(a) (delegation to General Counsel); § 202.5(b) (granting of
access or referrals by the Commission itself) (1986).
150 In a case involving a broker-dealer, however, the SEC could use its Exchange
Act inspection powers to obtain the desired information.
"I' It will also be necessary to agree on whether the SEC, if it obtains assistance
at the investigatory stage based on a determination that fraud-based violations may
have occurred, can still use the information it obtains if it later determines that the
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iv. The SEC should agree that any agreement does not by its
terms apply to private lawsuits. The SEC is probably also willing to
agree to use its best efforts to ensure that information it receives under
any agreement is not used by either private parties or other United
States government agencies. 52 However, the SEC cannot, on its own,
preclude the possibility of FOIA requests, IRS requests, and congres-
sional requests for information. In the case of the FOIA, action by both
houses of Congress, not just the Senate as in treaty ratification, would
be required to amend the statute to reduce foreigners' exposure under
the FOIA.
v. The SEC should consider granting greater access to United
States securities markets fo. Country X's companies or, at a minimum,
for particular types of Country X companies. For example, a system
could be developed to permit the more established companies in Coun-
try X easier access to United States markets.
Even a long-term bilateral accord is not the ultimate solution. Ab-
sent effective multilateral agreements there may eventually ensue a
"crace to the bottom" in which less reputable individuals and entities
move their securities operations to nations with whom the SEC has no
effective agreement. Therefore, although bilateral agreements are im-
portant, efforts to reach an effective multilateral accord should not be
delayed if this flight to countries with the "lowest common denomina-
tor" of securities regulation is to be prevented.
5.4. Multilateral Agreements
The SEC would perform only a limited role in negotiations by the
United States government to modify the Hague Convention or any
other multilateral agreement. However, the following discussion con-
centrates on the SEC's likely objectives, assuming State Department
agreement with them.
The SEC has expressed some dissatisfaction with the Hague Con-
vention. This is reflected in the United States Government's Supreme
Court brief in the Aerospatiale case,153 which discusses four SEC at-
tempts to use the Hague Convention and concludes that "[tihe Com-
mission's experience with Hague Convention procedures . . .has not
been entirely positive .... ,,154 The United States brief does note that
violations were not fraudulent.
152 Presumably Country X would not object to SEC criminal referrals to the De-
partment of Justice.
153 Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
amici curiae, supra note 79.
'" Id. at 18.
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the SEC's experience with the Convention "may well be atypical"' 55
because requests under the Convention are more commonly made by
private parties. Nevertheless, the United States opposes any rule that
would force the United States government, or private parties, to make
"first use" of the Convention in all cases.
The SEC has asserted that the Convention is of limited use be-
cause it is available for use only in actual civil litigation, and not for
SEC administrative proceedings or SEC formal orders of investiga-
tion.15 In addition, the SEC has asserted that the application of Article
23 of the Convention is troublesome. 5 A special commission on the
operation of the Hague Convention in July 1985 also addressed Article
23.18 This commission reported that "serious problems [have] arisen as
a result of the co-existence of blocking statutes and the Article 23 reser-
vation. Indeed, the combined effort of a blocking statute and a general,
unrestricted reservation under Article 23 may paralyze the Convention
and has caused the courts in the United States not to use the
Convention."' 9
Negotiating amendments to the Hague Convention is likely to be a
complex and difficult process. If this process is to have any chance of
success, at least as it applies to SEC investigations, the SEC must be
willing to offer something in return. As we suggested with respect to
bilateral agreements, the SEC should be willing to negotiate multilat-
eral agreements providing for prompt help to foreign governments re-
questing its assistance. Also, the SEC might have to accept an agree-
ment that any changes in the Convention would apply only to
particular types of United States securities law violations. Of course,
other United States agencies may not be willing to accept changes to
the Convention on a limited basis.
Given the difficulties inherent in negotiating multilateral agree-
ments, the SEC may have to limit its goals. Minimum SEC objectives
might include: (i) clarifying types of civil proceedings to which the
Convention applies and (ii) extending the Convention to administrative
proceedings, and perhaps to investigations, but only for specific types of
suspected violations. In addition to restricting the types of violations,
some combination of the variety of standards (e.g., materiality and rele-
vancy) discussed in Section 5.3 might be necessary as a further limita-
155 Id.
156 See Mann & Sullivan, supra note 66, at 504.
157 Id.
158 See Report on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Opera-
tion of the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1668 (1985).
159 Id. at 1677.
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tion on when the Convention will apply.
If negotiating changes to the Hague Convention does not appear to
be a reasonable objective, the SEC should consider seeking a multilat-
eral agreement, covering the same areas as the bilateral agreements dis-
cussed above, with the appropriate securities regulators of those nations
(e.g., Japan and Western European nations) with the most sophisti-
cated/active securities markets. Although this would not entirely pre-
vent a race to the bottom, it might at least be more effective than a
series of unrelated bilateral agreements.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Given that some blocking statutes render consent agreements inef-
fective at the investigatory stage, the optimum short-term solution, to at
least begin the negotiating process, is a bilateral informal arrangement
along the lines discussed in Section 5.3. This should be followed by a
more formal bilateral agreement that may require a MOU as a supple-
ment to clarify the intent of the two governments. As a long-range goal,
efforts could be made to renegotiate the Hague Convention to enhance
its effectiveness at the investigatory stage and thus prevent wrongdoers
from simply moving to countries with less regulation and no effective
agreements with the United States. Such a long-range multilateral
agreement would prevent development of this "race to the bottom." If
Hague Convention renegotiation does not prove to be a realistic goal,
efforts should be made to negotiate multilateral agreements among na-
tions with the most sophisticated/active securities markets to at least
increase the levels of international cooperation.
Regardless of whether the agreement being negotiated is bilateral
or multilateral, foreign countries are likely to be particularly interested
in the development of procedures to ensure effective SEC help in re-
sponse to their requests for assistance. Although mutual assistance is
currently of greater value to the SEC, this situation is likely to change
because, as foreign markets grow, foreign countries will want to obtain
evidence concerning the activities of United States citizens trading in
such overseas markets. The SEC is likely to initially desire the estab-
lishment of (i) a central authority in each foreign country to handle
requests for assistance and (ii) workable standards (perhaps varying at
the investigatory, pretrial discovery and actual trial stages) governing
what types of requests for assistance will be honored. Increased cooper-
ation at the investigatory stage is likely to be of particular importance.
The SEC is also likely to seek to limit -application of the dual criminal-
ity requirement, for both negligent and fraudulent offenses, as an im-
portant long-term component of its efforts to deter disclosure violations
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and thus ensure a flow of accurate information to United States trading
markets.
Growing internationalization of the securities markets is a reality.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements offer a number of advantages
over the case-by-case enforcement of subpoenas and discovery requests
by United States courts, not only in terms of efficiency, but also in
terms of improved relations among governments, regulatory agencies
and judicial systems. Although negotiation of formal treaties may be a
long-range goal, it is crucial that the process of developing such accords
proceed as quickly as possible. Informal understandings are likely to be
a key element of this process, because successful cooperation between
the SEC and foreign regulators under informal agreements will help
create the atmosphere of cooperation and growing trust necessary to
negotiate long-range, comprehensive agreements, whether bilateral or
multilateral.
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